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INTRODUCTION
It is understandable that no great fuss has been made of the hundredth
anniversary of the establishment of South Africa as a nation state within its
current borders (through the South Africa Act 9 Edw VII, ch 9). The Act of
Union, after all, while it represented a triumph for those arguing for the
formal reconciliation of ‘Boer and Brit’, marked much more negatively the
exclusion of the majority of the new country’s population from any effective
say in the institutions of government. Not only were the proponents of
federalism, which might have allowed the less conservative leadership in the
Cape Colony to retain a degree of autonomy through which to pursue
government based on individual worth, soundly defeated, but the elements
of non-racial government preserved in the Cape franchise arrangements (and
to a lesser extent, those of Natal) were seen as provisions to be protected as a
dying species, rather than as bridgeheads for their expansion more widely
within the Union.
Subsequent developments of course merely reinforced these portents, in
that the powers of provincial government became increasingly circum-
scribed in favour of central government, and as the franchise became
increasingly determined on grounds of race-classification. So when the
franchise became non-sexist, only white women were allowed to vote (see
the Women’s Enfranchisement Act 18 of 1930), and the electoral influence of
those black South Africans who qualified to vote was considerably diluted in
the 1930s and 1950s. If one looks at the legislative agenda of the first Union
Parliament, one realises too that the security of the new state and racial
exclusion were the driving forces behind much of the law it made (see, for
example, the Immigration Regulations Act 22 of 1913, the Natives Land Act
27 of 1913, and the Riotous Assemblies and Criminal Law Amendment
Act 27 of 1914).
Despite this gloomy picture, I would argue that for those interested in the
administration of justice there is indeed something to celebrate, and that is
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the establishment of a unified superior court system, with a single appellate
body at its apex (for the present ignoring the significance of appeal to the
Privy Council, which was seldom used, and finally removed by the Privy
Council Appeals Act 16 of 1950). In this brief review marking a century of
unified administration of justice at superior court level in this country, it
seems important to be reminded of the political circumstances faced by the
Supreme Court of South Africa, the better to appreciate its achievements. I
do this too because so much of the early jurisprudence of the Appellate
Division (AD) directly fashioned our ‘legal culture’, preparing the ground
(both positively and negatively) for the role of the courts in the current
constitutional democracy. It is also appropriate to draw some comparisons
with the establishment and early record of the Constitutional Court for there
are, in my view, important similarities to be noted, which may assist us in
monitoring and assessing the work of the latter court in the years ahead.
CREATING AN APEX COURT
Each of the four constituent territories which made up the Union had had its
own supreme court, with the Cape leading the way through the Charters of
Justice introduced under British rule in 1828 and 1832. It is important to
note that both Afrikaner republics had adopted written constitutions in the
1850s, which to a certain extent had provided basic rights for their citizens
(narrowly defined so as to exclude ‘non-Afrikaners’), so that their courts
were accustomed to dealing in matters of broader political moment. The
superficial similarity, however, hid two ‘widely divergent Afrikaner constitu-
tional traditions’, in the words of the historian Leonard Thompson. On the
one hand, the Orange Free State had a rigid constitution, the judiciary acted
independently, and the Volksraad (or parliament) stayed within its legislative
powers, whereas the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR or Transvaal)
brought the opposite experience in all these respects into the Union (see L M
Thompson ‘Constitutionalism in the South African Republics’ 1954 Butter-
worths South African Law Review 49 at 73). The fourth colonial court, that of
Natal, while superficially based on the same British model as that in the Cape,
added little of significance to the future court structure. (For an account of
the administration of justice in that part of the country, see Peter Spiller A
History of the District and Supreme Courts of Natal 1846–1910 (1986).) Indeed,
the manner in which Zulu leader Dinizulu was tried immediately prior to
Union (see In re Dinizulu (1908) 29 NLR 161 and 277) is likely to have
tarnished its reputation. Perhaps not unrelated to this, the first Natal judge to
serve on the AD was G M Holmes, appointed only in 1960.
The leading figure in the Cape legal tradition was undoubtedly its Chief
Justice since 1873, Sir Henry de Villiers (more detail on what follows can be
found in Eric Walker Lord De Villiers and His Times (1925)). Through his
constitutionally-prescribed office as President of the Legislative Council (the
upper house of Parliament) at the Cape, he had been widely involved in
public affairs, and had for example attempted to mediate in the constitutional
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dispute between President Kruger and Chief Justice Kotzé in the ZAR after
the latter’s judgment in Brown v Leyds NO ((1897) 4 Off Rep 17). Sir Henry
had been attempting for at least twenty years to set up a single court of appeal
for all the territories of southern Africa, and this campaign had shown him
that a powerful supreme court would not be acceptable to the politicians. His
views deeply influenced the approach to the judicial branch of government
adopted by the delegates to the National Convention, which he chaired and
which gathered in 1908–1909 to draft the Constitution of the Union. In
particular, Sir Henry also chaired the Convention committee which consid-
ered his proposals for the future structure of the administration of justice, and
which became Part VI of the South Africa Act. Thus was the Supreme Court
of South Africa established, with effect from 1 June 1910, incorporating the
pre-existing courts of the constituent colonies as provincial divisions, and
adding an Appellate Division, while retaining the possibility of a final appeal
to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London. (For more detail
on all these matters, see Hugh Corder Judges at Work (1984) at 7–17.)
The AD sat for the first time on 4 June 1910. Although its formal seat was
Bloemfontein, cases could be heard elsewhere ‘at the convenience of suitors’
(South Africa Act, s 109). While there had been a great degree of speculation
about who would be appointed as its members, it was almost a foregone
conclusion that Sir Henry de Villiers would become the first Chief Justice.
He was duly appointed, whereupon he became Lord de Villiers of Wynberg,
and he served on the court until 1914. He was joined on the AD by Sir James
Rose Innes, former Chief Justice of the Transvaal, and Sir William Solomon,
a judge of the same court as Judges of Appeal (JA). The Judges President of
the Cape (C G Maasdorp) and of the Transvaal (JA J de Villiers) in turn joined
them as Additional Judges of Appeal (AJA). From a formal point of view,
much agitation attended the place for hearing many of the early appeals to the
court, because Lord de Villiers seemed to interpret the convenience of the
‘suitors’ to mean judicial convenience, such that the court was rather a
travelling tribunal, but this soon resolved itself, especially after the construc-
tion of a building for the AD in Bloemfontein, which opened in 1929. (For
further details on this aspect, see Corder op cit at 22–3, and Ian Farlam ‘The
Appellate Division: 1910 to 1948’ (2010) 23 Advocate 16–22.) The other
formal matter which occasioned public and professional comment was the
selection of judges to fill vacancies occasioned by retirement or death, as well
as by the expansion of the number of appellate judges from time to time to
cope with the inevitable increase in its workload. (For commentary on the
appointments process and its outcome in the period 1910 to 1980, see
Corder op cit ch 2, and Christopher Forsyth In Danger for their Talents (1985)
ch 1.) There are currently twenty-one permanent members of the AD’s
successor, the Supreme Court of Appeal.
So much for the formal aspects of the establishment of a single superior
court for South Africa. Of much greater importance is its jurisprudential
record, and the impact of such work on the broadly political life of the nation
which it has served for one hundred years, to which I now turn.
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THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN GOVERNMENT
In what appears above, I have focused exclusively on the only new court
created in 1910. Naturally, the superior courts of the former colonies (the
provincial divisions of the Cape of Good Hope, the Eastern Cape, the
Northern Cape, the Orange Free State, Natal and the Transvaal) continued
to hear disputes and hand down judgments, many of which had a significant
impact on social relations. The most influential court in the country was,
however, undoubtedly the AD, for its writ ran nationally, and its decisions
bound all other courts through the doctrine of precedent. In addition, it was
effectively the final court of appeal for all South African disputes: until its
abolition in 1950, leave was granted to appeal to the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council on only ten occasions (see Forsyth op cit at 5), and it was
only in one of those instances that the judgment of that body was of any real
moment; that being when the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
declared penalty clauses in contracts to be unlawful, and where rather
negative comments were made by that committee about Roman Dutch
jurisprudence (see Pearl Assurance v Union Government 1934 AD 560, and for a
brief discussion of the matter, see Forsyth op cit at 2–5).
Within the scope of this celebratory reflection on the leading court in this
country, I cannot possibly begin to do justice to the complexity of its record
across all fields of the law. In this respect, I can but refer to several of the many
studies which now exist, which catalogue mainly (but not exclusively) public
law aspects of its work. In no special order, the following works constitute
the main body of literature in this field: Albie Sachs Justice in South Africa
(1973); A S Mathews Law, Order and Liberty in South Africa (1971); C J R
Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (1978); Corder op cit;
Forsyth op cit; David Dyzenhaus Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems (1991);
Stephen Ellmann Law and Liberty in South Africa’s State of Emergency (1992);
Michael Lobban White Man’s Justice (1996); and Ian Loveland By Due Process
of Law (1999).
The general impression which one gains from a reading of these studies
and of the judgments on which they are based is that the AD succeeded
admirably in building a legal system which took the best from both the
Roman Dutch authorities and the English common law and which was
suited predominantly to the needs of the emerging hegemonic white ruling
class. Commentators at the time remarked on the enormous opportunity
presented to the court to play a role in the development of a legal system for
the new nation state, and which could bring the two major factions in the
white population together, just less than a decade after the formal conclusion
of a bitter war. So a leading academic (R W Lee, Professor of Roman Dutch
Law at Oxford, in ‘Law and Legislation in the Union of South Africa’ (1923)
40 SALJ 442 at 443 and 448), commenting in the context of ‘lawyers’ law’,
wrote:
‘Seldom have the courts of any country enjoyed the opportunity which the
courts of South Africa now enjoy, of moulding the laws to their will, inspired
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but not hampered by tradition, aided but not checked by the legislator. . . . The
general impression . . . is . . . of a court which enjoys a liberty of action scarcely
to be paralleled in the history of modern states.’
While Lee may have been overstating the scope of creativity available to
the AD, there can be little doubt that the appointment to its ranks of such a
strong and experienced corps of judges at the outset allowed it to make a
strong impression on the governance through law of the fledgling nation.
The pedigree in public life and the dominant (if not domineering) part played
by Lord De Villiers is universally acknowledged. His successor as Chief
Justice, Sir James Rose Innes, the former Attorney General of the Cape and
an active party politician until his appointment directly to the Chief
Justiceship of post South African War Transvaal, gave strong leadership as
head of the court until 1927. By the mid–1930s, only six other judges had
been elevated to appellate status after the initial group of five, including the
redoubtable Sir John Kotzé and Sir Johannes Wessels, and several of them had
participated in political life before appointment to judicial office. However,
it is equally notorious that, with some singularly principled exceptions in
individual cases or even for some short periods of time (such as in the early
1950s), when it came to the adjudication of disputes between those resisting
government policy, especially if they were black, and the state, the AD
increasingly identified with the government of the day and against individual
liberty. The evidence for this is to be seen at least in the concluding chapters
of all the above studies, and this judicial ‘executive-mindedness’ reached its
most extreme level during the states of emergency of the 1980s.
Why and how did this happen? While there are reasons aplenty through-
out the eight decades of jurisprudence until the effective end of apartheid, in
considering briefly the role of the AD in government, I will concentrate
rather on the decades immediately after the establishment of the court, when
it was finding its feet in the structures of governance of South Africa, and
establishing its relationship with the legislature and executive in terms of the
doctrine of the separation of powers such as it was under the Westminster
constitutional system. Martin Chanock has written imaginatively and per-
ceptively about the development of a ‘legal culture’ in this period (see The
Making of South African Legal Culture 1902–1936: Fear, Favour and Prejudice
(2001)). In retrospect, he sums up the South African state after 1910 (see
Chanock op cit at 10–11) as being characterised by the maxim that the safety
of the state was the supreme law, by the ambivalence of the judges who were
accorded some respect, but ‘without final power’, by the absence of
predetermined structural roles for the executive and the judiciary, by the
fragility of the state, by the strong congruence between the use of force and
the law, by the apparent supremacy of the government over the constitution,
and by the ‘expressed need of the state to demonstrate internationally that it
could maintain law and order’. He reaches these conclusions after recounting
a summary (op cit at 4–10) of two trials in which those who resisted the state
were convicted and sentenced to harsh penalties, including execution in the
case of a leader of striking white workers (see R v Long 1923 AD 52). Given
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the strong personalities on the appellate bench at the time and the equally
strong identity of interests with those then leading government in Parliament
and Cabinet, and bearing in mind the fractious nature of ‘white’ South
Africans (many of whom rebelled against the decision to support Britain at
the outbreak of the First World War), while the militant working class on the
mines struck repeatedly and often violently until the mid–1920s, is it
surprising that the AD’s judgments overwhelmingly supported the political
status quo? (For greater details on such assertions, see Corder op cit chs 4 and
5 and the Postscript. See also, for example, Krohn v Minister for Defence &
another 1915 AD 191 and Sachs & Diamond v Minister of Justice 1934 AD 11.)
In similar vein, in the face of the perceived threat from ‘non-Europeans’
and ‘natives’, the AD’s approach was almost as unequivocal from the outset,
and became more uniform with the passage of time, perhaps with the
exception of their response to the early apartheid measures of the 1950s. So
we see the phrase ‘of European parentage or extraction’ being confined to
those all four of whose grandparents were white, in Moller v Keimoes School
Committee (1911 AD 635); the majority of the AD holding that a ministerial
regulation which deemed all Asians to be prohibited immigrants on the basis
of their unsuitability ‘on economic grounds or standards or habits of life’ to
the needs of the Union was valid, in R v Padsha (1923 AD 281); and the court
ruling unanimously that racial segregation of services in post offices, again
through executive fiat, was valid in law, on the basis that equal services were
provided at both counters (see Rasool v Minister of Posts & Telegraphs 1934 AD
167). While the court was, in modern terms, equally sexist in holding that
‘persons’ wishing to register as candidate attorneys did not include women
(see Incorporated Law Society v Wookey 1912 AD 623), this ruling came to work
a less restrictive effect when a majority of the judges ruled that the
requirement that ‘every native’ had to carry a pass at night in Pretoria did not
include women (see R v Detody 1926 AD 198). However, when it came to
the constitutionality of changes to the franchise arrangements for black South
Africans, the court had little difficulty in approving them in terms of the
procedures set out in the South Africa Act (see R v Ndobe 1930 AD 484 and
Ndlwana v Hofmeyr NO 1937 AD 229).
Thus it was, I would argue, that by the mid–1930s, the AD had through its
judgments played its part in the consolidation of a broad, ‘white’ South
African ruling group, to the exclusion of extreme elements within its ranks,
and of all those not regarded as belonging to the ‘white race’. There were
certainly isolated instances throughout the ensuing years in which the AD
found for appellants outside the ranks of this ruling group, even in the darkest
days of the emergency, thus maintaining a degree of legitimacy for the court
and contributing to the preservation in the minds of many of the idea that a
measure of justice could be achieved through the law (in support of which
see the recent work of Jens Meierhenrich The Legacies of Law (2008)). Yet the
overwhelming impression is one of identity with white rule, and an
unwillingness to push the limits of the separation of powers. Within the
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context of parliamentary sovereignty under Westminster, this approach is not
surprising, but then is there any reason to mark the hundredth anniversary of
the founding of such a court? I would argue that there is yet cause for modest
celebration, for at least two reasons, to which I turn in the last part of this
note.
PROVIDING A ROLE MODEL
In the first place, the existence of the AD as the highest court in the country
from 1910 until 1994 meant that there was a single point at which every
dispute in law would finally be resolved, thus uniting at least three relatively
distinct legal traditions and sets of judicial precedent which had existed
before 1910. This is in itself not an insignificant achievement for, although
the Cape legal and judicial professions dominated the subcontinent, there
were competing models and testy (even arrogant) individuals to be accom-
modated. While the outcome in particular appeals may from time to time
have been both controversial, perhaps substantially incorrect, and sometimes
simply unjust, there can be little doubt that those appointed to appellate
judgeships were, with very few exceptions, lawyers of technical competence,
great capacity for hard work, and committed to the supremacy of the law. It is
so that this last aspect, which is central to every conception of the rule of law,
was frequently not complemented by a judicial commitment to the protec-
tion of basic rights which has come to be seen as a further essential element in
that conception. Yet I would maintain that the formal independence,
impartiality, and adherence to high professional standards which character-
ised the judiciary generally and which were strengthened by the leadership
given by the AD, stood the country in good stead at the time of the political
transition, and will continue to do so. Some extraordinarily good lawyers
served as judges in the AD over the decades, and the level of courage and the
commitment to basic principles of justice that were displayed by the judges
particularly in the face of early apartheid legislation stand as exemplary
beacons for all judges, everywhere. Their commitment to the ‘universally
significant human achievement’ that rule should be through law (see E P
Thompson Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (1975) at 265)
should likewise not be forgotten amidst the welter of justified criticism.
The fact that, despite the dreadful effects on the judicial mind of the
excesses of apartheid and the sometimes unduly deferential attitudes to the
executive which the AD above all displayed, the continuation in office of
such judges under the post-apartheid government was even politically possible
in 1994, says much about the structure and efficiency of the day-to-day
operations of the courts until then. It is true that ‘punishment’was meted out
to the AD by depriving it of constitutional jurisdiction after 1994, and by
establishing a rival final appellate court in constitutional matters, but this
exclusionary action did not persist, and by 1997 the newly-named Supreme
Court of Appeal was back in the curial fold. It has since then more than made
its mark through its judgments on both constitutional and non-constitutional
aspects of South African law.
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But there is a second and perhaps more important reason why we should
be noting the role and attitudes of the AD as highest court in the first few
decades after Union, and in marking its subsequent fate. This relates to the
way in which it pursued sectional reconciliation between bitterly opposed
groups within the ‘white’ population as described in summary terms above.
Here there are lessons for the Constitutional Court (CC) since 1994: indeed,
I would argue that there are striking similarities between the roles played by
the courts in this regard, albeit in such a radically changed constitutional
context. This is a much larger project which deserves detailed treatment
unsuited to this note, yet it may be valuable to point to several points of
intersection in the experiences of the courts, and their unexpressed public
policies.
Let us begin with the fabric. The CC also started its operations in
temporary quarters, though there was never any doubt that it would find a
permanent home in Braamfontein, not Bloemfontein or anywhere else, and
it had to wait less than a decade for its custom-built home on Constitution
Hill. Not too much should be read into the contrasting styles of architecture
chosen, for the 1929 building fitted the archetype of most of the superior
court buildings elsewhere in this country (see the photographs accompany-
ing the articles about the histories of the constituent parts of the Supreme
Court of South Africa contained in (2010) 23 Advocate) and indeed many
others of similar vintage elsewhere in the British Commonwealth. Yet it must
be said that the style and symbolism captured by the CC building is unusually
engaged with its surroundings and remarkably open and challenging. As to
those appointed to the first CC Bench in October 1994, again there were
several lawyers with deep roots in political activism and public life: indeed,
like Lord de Villiers, the first President of the CC, Justice Chaskalson, had
co-chaired the committee at the constitutional negotiations which had
drafted the entire interim Constitution, with the exception of the chapter on
Fundamental Rights. Even those who were already judges at the time of their
elevation to the CC had had rather unusual judicial careers during which
they had displayed their commitment to constitutional democratic rights. So,
like those appointed to the AD in 1910, the members of the CC in 1994
would have had a strong awareness of the social forces which had produced
the interim Constitution (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act
200 of 1993) and a good sense of what was expected of them as the highest
court in constitutional matters.
As to their jurisprudence, we must naturally screen out, as far as is possible,
the enormous differences between the constitutional texts which these courts
had to interpret, as well as the difference in the roles formally allocated to
them by those texts. Yet even given these differences, I would argue that the
CC has, above all else, pursued an implicit ‘nation-making’ agenda as a
guiding philosophy, with the emphasis on inclusiveness, reconciliation,
compromise, redress , basic rights and the delivery of the socio-economic
promises so explicitly made in the final Constitution (Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996). In addition, it has taken seriously the
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founding values contained in s 1 of the final Constitution, especially
‘accountability, responsiveness and openness’. While the CC has only been
delivering judgments for fifteen years, I do not believe that it is too early to
make this claim, which is borne out, I would argue, both by its style
(including the design of its building) of operating and by some of its landmark
judgments.
So the symbolism of hearing the question of the constitutionality of the
death penalty as the first appeal (S v Makwanyane & others 1995 (3) SA 391
(CC)), the fact that the justices of the CC spoke unanimously but also
separately and eloquently in holding it to be unconstitutional, and the fact
that the court was even prepared to be seized of the matter in the face of the
evident reluctance of the constitutional negotiators to speak clearly on it, all
contributed to setting the benchmark for its future judgments and demon-
strated its acute self-consciousness about its part in the new dispensation.
Since then, there have been many examples of such an approach, such as
President of the RSA v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC), National Coalition for Gay &
Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC), Government of the
Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), Minister of Health v
Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC), Bhe v Magistrate,
Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; South African Human Rights Commission v President
of RSA 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC), Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 (1) SA
524 (CC), Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006
(6) SA 416 (CC), Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township v City of
Johannesburg 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC), Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and
Reconciliation 2010 (3) SA 293 (CC), and many more. Each of these cases
provided the opportunity for the CC to establish and reinforce its commit-
ment to the constitutional democratic enterprise as a whole and to certain
aspects in particular, and the leadership of the court realised in the light of the
confused aftermath of Makwanyane that it was important to ensure that the
gist of its findings in each case is framed in such a way that it can be widely
used by the media and understood by the public. So the court now produces
a non-binding summary together with each of its judgments, and the
standard of public reporting of such judgments has improved, facilitating
greater legitimacy for the work of the court and promoting understanding of
the Constitution to which it must give life.
Perhaps the moment at which the conscious pursuit of this ‘nation-
building’ approach was most clearly evident was in the judgment of the CC
in Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) v President of the RSA (1996 (4) SA
671 (CC)). As most will know, this appeal concerned a challenge to the civil
amnesty provisions of the National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995
(s 20(7)), which itself was adopted to give legislative expression to the
‘postamble’ headed ‘National Unity and Reconciliation’ in the interim
Constitution. Significantly, the leading judgment for the CC was written in
typical style by the senior black judge, Ismail Mohamed, who would become
South Africa’s first black Chief Justice not long afterwards. While he
recognised that there was much weight in the arguments of the appellants,
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and while he sympathised with their anger and grief, he was forced to
conclude that to allow the appeal would invalidate one of the key elements of
the elaborate process of political compromise on which the constitutional
edifice was constructed. In his words (para 19):
‘If the Constitution kept alive the prospect of continuous retaliation and
revenge, the agreement of those threatened . . . might never have been
forthcoming, and . . . the bridge [between the past and present] would have
remained wobbly and insecure. . . . It was for this reason that those who
negotiated the Constitution made a deliberate choice, preferring understanding
over vengeance, reparation over retaliation, ubuntu over victimization.’
The AZAPO judgment, I would argue, represents a critical milestone in the
role which the CC has played in the development of the South African nation
after 1994. There are sure to be other parallels which one could draw between
the work of the AD from 1910 to about 1935 and that of the CC in its first
fifteen years, and these ought to be explored.
An obvious focus of any such study would be the CC’s approach to the
limits of its jurisdiction under the separation of powers, and particularly its
regulation of the exercise of discretionary authority by the executive. Some
may argue controversially that the decreasing frequency of appointment of
appellate judges with ‘political pasts’ from the 1930s led to timidity when
faced with a rampant executive. Others would counter this by ascribing this
shift in attitudes to changes in the broader politics of the country, indeed the
world, after 1945. Could something similar occur with changing patterns of
appointment to the CC?
Whatever the focus, I would argue that the part played by the AD in
consolidating its vision of nation-building at that time, and the similar but
also profoundly different project on which the CC has been engaged since
1994, represents the most obvious point of congruence. Even if one does not
accept this proposition fully, those with an interest in the promotion and
strengthening of the current constitutional dispensation should learn lessons
from the relative fall from grace which marked the work of the AD from the
late 1950s, and apply these in their critical engagement with the jurispru-
dence of the CC. For this reason alone, the centenary of the establishment of
a unified superior court system in South Africa is an event worth celebrating.
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